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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Much has been written about the law in virtual worlds, though the focus has 
been on the more obviously applicable areas of the law, namely property, 
copyright, and crime.  Indeed, in the few instances when disputes involving virtual 
worlds have reached a federal court, the focus has usually been on contract or 
copyright claims.  It is the purpose of this paper to argue for the use of the antitrust 
laws as set forth in sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,1 and possibly the Clayton 
Act,2 to forestall the anticompetitive behavior of virtual world developers. 
First, this paper will discuss the general purposes of antitrust law and the 
reasons for their preeminence in commercial law.  Second, this paper will focus on 
the economic effect of real-money trading (“RMT”) in virtual worlds, focusing on 
the perceived, as well as the actual, impacts on commerce.  Third, this paper will 
argue for the application of section 1 of the Sherman Act’s prohibition against 
tying arrangements as it relates to RMT.  Fourth, this paper will argue for the 
application of section 2 of the Sherman Act’s prohibition against monopoly as it 
relates to RMT.  Finally, this paper will introduce the possibility of liability under 
the Clayton Act, noting the difficulty inherent in such analysis because of the 
nature of in-game items. 
                                                          
 J.D. Candidate 2010, Columbia Law School; B.A. Political Science 2002, University of 
Pennsylvania.  The Author would like to thank Professor Greg Lastowka, Rutgers School of Law, 
Camden, and Professor Scott Hemphill, Columbia Law School, for their advice, insight, and 
encouragement, as well as the staff of the Pepperdine Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law 
for its editorial assistance. 
1 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006). 
2 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000). 
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II.  PURPOSES OF ANTITRUST LAW 
In its relatively brief existence, the Sherman Act has received some of the 
highest protection of all of our federal laws.  Less than ninety years after its 
enactment, Justice Thurgood Marshall described the antitrust laws, particularly the 
Sherman Act, as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise.”3  As Marshall saw them, 
they were “as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental 
personal freedoms.”4  Earlier courts have also described the Sherman Act as “a 
comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered 
competition as the rule of trade.”5  As Justice Black explained in Northern Pacific 
Railway Co. v. United States: 
[The Sherman Act] rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of 
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the 
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the 
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our 
democratic political and social institutions.6 
While the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition, there are 
certain practices which, “because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack 
of any redeeming virtue,” are “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and 
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused 
or the business excuse for their use.”7  Some of these practices which the courts 
have held to be per se unreasonable under section 1 of the Sherman Act include 
price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements.8  It is this 
last practice that is of particular relevance in virtual worlds. 
While section 1 is the most frequently invoked section of the Act,9 it is 
incomplete because it only applies to conduct by two or more actors.10  
Accordingly, Congress addressed this deficiency in section 2,11 effectively 
conferring upon the federal courts “a new jurisdiction to apply a ‘common law’ 
against monopolizing.”12  Unlike section 1 of the Sherman Act, section 2 is aimed 
not at improper conduct but “at a pernicious market structure in which the 
concentration of power saps the salubrious influence of competition.”13  Judge 
                                                          
3 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
4 Id. 
5 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United 
States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933). 
6 N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 4. 
7 Id. at 5. 
8 Id. 
9 “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.”  15 
U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
10 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1979). 
11 “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
12 Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 272 (quoting 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 40 (1978)). 
13 Id. 
2010 ANTI-TRUST LAW AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 371 
 
Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America explained that the 
Sherman Act is based on the following belief: “that possession of unchallenged 
economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that 
immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial 
progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable 
disposition to let well enough alone.”14  Judge Hand went on to explain that 
Congress was not “actuated by economic motives alone” in enacting section 2.15  
Indeed, “[c]onsiderations of political and social policy form a major part of our 
aversion to monopolies, for concentration of power in the hands of a few obstructs 
opportunities for the rest.”16  Yet, in reviewing monopoly claims under section 2, 
courts must be cautious not to let the Sherman Act “be invoked perversely in favor 
of those who seek protection against the rigors of competition.”17  As Judge Hand 
is often quoted as saying, “The successful competitor, having been urged to 
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”18  The balancing of successful 
innovation on the one hand and competition on the other is a difficult process not 
easily resolved, and of the utmost concern when it comes to the study of virtual 
worlds. 
III.  ECONOMIC EFFECT OF REAL-MONEY TRADING IN VIRTUAL WORLDS 
Since around 1987, players of virtual worlds have traded items from the 
games for real money, or RMT.19  Though the statistics are imprecise, they are 
quite staggering.  There are over 20 million people playing such games, and the 
global amount of RMT is somewhere between $100 million and over $1 billion 
annually.20  Edward Castronova, in his landmark 2001 article, noted that nearly a 
third of the adults paying for one virtual world spent more time in the world in a 
typical week than they do working for pay.21  The issue has become quite 
controversial and divisive, leading to several lawsuits.22  Additionally, publications 
have described unseemly images of overworked “gold farmers” all over the 
world.23  Beyond all this, however, the main reason cited in favor of the 
                                                          
14 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). 
15 Id. 
16 Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 273. 
17 Id. 
18 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430. 
19 Edward Castronova, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Real-Money Trade in the Products of Synthetic 
Economies, 8 INFO, at 2 (Oct. 2006) [hereinafter Castronova, Cost-Benefit Analysis], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=917124. 
20 Id. at 4. 
21 Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society on the 
Cyberian Frontier, at 3 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 618, 
2001) [hereinafter Castronova, Virtual Worlds], available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=294828. 
22 Complaint, Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. v. In Game Dollar, LLC, No. SACV07-0589 (C.D. Cal. May 
22, 2007); Complaint, Hernandez v. Internet Gaming Entm’t, Ltd., No. 07-21403 (S.D. Fla. Aug, 17, 
2007). 
23 See, e.g., Julian Dibbell, The Life of the Chinese Gold Farmer, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/magazine/17lootfarmers-t.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all; JULIAN 
DIBBELL, PLAY MONEY: OR HOW I QUIT MY DAY JOB AND MADE MILLIONS TRADING VIRTUAL 
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prohibition of RMT is that it “disturbs the game’s atmosphere; it is said to be 
‘wrong’ and ‘against the rules’.”24  For these reasons, among others, nearly all 
virtual world developers have prohibited the practice of RMT through their End 
User License Agreements (“EULAs”) or their Terms of Service/Use 
(“TOS/TOU”).25  An excerpt of such a provision, from Sony’s Everquest II User 
Agreement and Software License, states as follows: “You may not buy, sell or 
auction (or host or facilitate the ability to allow others to buy, sell or auction) any 
Game account, characters, items, coin or copyrighted material or any other 
intellectual property owned or controlled by us or our licensors False.”26 
Though potential antitrust liability has not been thoroughly examined in this 
burgeoning field, several scholars have discussed the perceived economic effects 
of virtual worlds generally, and RMT in particular.27  As Castronova explains, a 
virtual world’s business success derives from “[its] ability to attract customers who 
are willing to pay an on-going fee to visit the world, and that requires [virtual 
worlds] to offer a form of entertainment that is persistently more attractive than the 
competition.”28  According to Castronova, the true source of a virtual world’s 
success lies in the nature of scarcity: “Constraints create the possibility of 
achievement, and it is the drive to achieve something with the avatar that seems to 
create an obsessive interest in her well-being.”29  Yet in-game items are unique in 
that they are “infinitely-durable goods,” the stock of which rises continually as 
more and more people enter the virtual world.30  What results is a decrease in 
demand and thus a fall in RMT price; indeed, the only reason such markets persist 
is that virtual worlds continue to introduce new items, whose initial scarcity 
sustains their demand for a time.31  This leads to a network monopoly, driven by 
the fact that most users seem to be willing to “live” in at most one virtual world at 
a time, as switching worlds is costly and requires time to reacquaint oneself.32 
Despite this tendency toward network monopoly, Castronova suggests 
several reasons why the virtual market is not likely to be monopolized.33  First, he 
notes differing tastes and the fact that production of game content and its 
maintenance are such labor intensive activities make it difficult for one developer 
                                                          
LOOT,18–19 (2006). 
24 Castronova, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 19, at 13. 
25 Arseni Starodoumov, Real Money Trade Model in Virtual Economies, at 17 (June 16, 2005) 
(unpublished Master’s thesis, Stockholm School of Economics, Institute of International Business), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=958286&rec=1&srcabs=917124. 
26 Id. at 39. 
27 See, e.g., Castronova, Virtual Worlds, supra note 21; Edward Castronova, On Virtual Economies 
(Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 752, 2002) [hereinafter 
Castronova, Virtual Economies], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=338 
500&rec=1&srcabs=294828; Starodoumov, supra note 25; Castronova, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra 
note 19; Jun-Sok Huhh, Economic Analysis on Online Game Service (Feb. 5, 2009) (unpublished 
comment, on file with the Seoul National University School of Economics), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1335120. 
28 Castronova, Virtual Worlds, supra note 21, at 8–9. 
29 Id. at 15. 
30 Id. at 23. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 8. 
33 Castronova, On Virtual Economies, supra note 27, at 24–27. 
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to produce a world big enough to monopolize the market.34  Second, he argues that 
congestion tends away from monopoly, the reduction of which can only be 
accomplished through the addition of more content.35  Yet, Castronova notes that 
“[i]n every game currently on the market, the owners consider it their right to 
introduce changes to game mechanics at any time, without prior consultation with 
the players,” leading to the possibility of accounts being terminated and thus losing 
market value overnight.36  He argues that player protest and exits are powerful 
resistance options, however, we are yet to see a widespread change in policy, and 
the subscription base of virtual worlds has only increased.37  It is the argument of 
this paper that the prohibitive switching costs and the developer’s control over the 
game’s content, particularly its ability to increase or decrease in-game items, leads 
to the potential for antitrust liability. 
The introduction of RMT leads to a common quandary: While such 
transactions arguably improve the well-being of both parties and increase their 
enjoyment of the game, it can ruin “the ambience of the game world.”38  Yet, the 
policies set forth by virtual worlds regarding RMT have universally been imposed 
“on the people rather than with the people.”39  Given the closed nature of 
individual worlds, the basic priceable input for asset growth is time.40  The 
challenge level of any virtual world depends on the assets and characteristics the 
player has or is in progress of attaining, but the challenge level offered by game 
designers will not be equal to the ideal challenge level of one or more players.41  
When discrepancies are sufficiently high between the designers’ challenge level 
and the ideal challenge level, the player’s satisfaction will be so low that he will be 
tempted to increase his assets to change the game’s challenge level.42  Because of 
the virtual world’s limitations, the player will price the virtual assets needed for the 
higher game satisfaction in real world currency.43  Several reasons have been 
argued for why RMT is detrimental and produces external welfare losses, but the 
economic impact is nominal.44  Castronova points out, however, that a one percent 
increase in RMT would only have a 1/20th of one percent impact on the demand 
                                                          
34 Id. at 25.  It is interesting to note that Castronova’s possibility for increased production (“opening 
your game code to the public”) is precisely the model of virtual worlds like Second Life. 
35 Id. at 25–26.  A third argument is his claim that the huge switching costs between worlds should 
lead to competitors offering new players the opportunity to start their avatars at a higher level of wealth 
and ability if they can provide evidence of a high level in another game.  Id. at 26.  As Castronova 
argues, “[B]y not offering this kind of monetary opt-in, the companies implicitly encourage the buying 
and selling of avatars outside the game.”  Id.  Of course, the existence of countless EULAs prohibiting 
such trade seems to indicate otherwise. 
36 Id. at 33. 
37 Id., at 35. 
38 Id. at 34. 
39 Castronova, On Virtual Economies, supra note 27, at 34. 
40 Starodoumov, supra note 25, at 31. 
41 Id. at 32. 
42 Id. at 33. 
43 Id. 
44 Castronova, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 19, at 15–19.  Castronova sets forth five reasons: 
(1) disrupts the game’s fantasy atmosphere; (2) causes inflation; (3) encourages misuse of the game’s 
resources; (4) encourages misuse of game’s communication systems; and (5) leads to high customer 
service costs.  Id. 
374 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II 
 
for subscriptions, and a 1/20th of one percent impact on customer service costs.45 
IV.  TYING ARRANGEMENTS 
The Supreme Court has defined a tying arrangement as “an agreement by a 
party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a 
different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he [or she] will not purchase that 
product from any other supplier.”46  Historically, courts have held that tying 
arrangements serve “hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition,”47 
and are per se unreasonable “whenever a party has sufficient economic power with 
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market 
for the tied product and a ‘not insubstantial’ amount of interstate commerce is 
affected.”48  However, the Court has made clear that “every refusal to sell two 
products separately cannot be said to restrain competition.”49  If each of the 
products may be purchased separately in a competitive market, one seller’s 
decision to sell the two products together imposes no unreasonable restraint on 
either market, particularly if competing suppliers are free to sell either the entire 
package or its several parts.50  It follows that virtual worlds which ban real-money 
trading may be involved in tying arrangements; by enforcing this ban, they are 
effectively preventing competing suppliers from freely selling in-game products.51 
Courts have concluded: 
[T]he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the 
seller’s exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer 
into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or 
might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.52 
Thus, when such “forcing” is present, competition on the merits in the 
market for the tied item is restrained and a Sherman Act violation exists.53  
Accordingly, courts will condemn tying arrangements “when the seller has some 
special ability—usually called ‘market power’—to force a purchaser to do 
something that he would not do in a competitive market.”54  From the consumer’s 
                                                          
45 Id. at 31–32. 
46 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958). 
47 Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949). 
48 N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6. 
49 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11 (1984). 
50 Id. at 11–12; see N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6 n.4 (explaining that “where the buyer is free to take 
either product by itself there is no tying problem even though the seller may also offer the two items as 
a unit at a single price”). 
51 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11–12; N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6 n.4.  Though not the 
focus of this article, the use of third-party software (or “bots”) would also arguably implicate the same 
antitrust issues. 
52 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12. 
53 Id. at 12–13; see Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) (“By 
conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of another, a seller coerces the abdication of 
buyers’ independent judgment as to the ‘tied’ product’s merits and insulates it from the competitive 
stresses of the open market.”). 
54 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13–14; see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 
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standpoint, the freedom to select the best bargain in the second market is impaired 
by his [or her] need to purchase the tying product from, and by an inability to 
evaluate the true cost of either product when they are available only as a package, 
something the Supreme Court has defined as “lifecycle pricing.”55  It is this 
question of market power that would likely pose one of the more difficult problems 
in enforcing a claim of an invalid tying arrangement when it comes to virtual 
worlds.  This question is particularly important because when the seller does 
possess such market power, an antitrust violation can be established “only by 
evidence of an unreasonable restraint on competition in the relevant market.”56  
The virtual world developer would likely claim that a single virtual world has little 
market power on its own, and its activities are thus disciplined by competition with 
other developers.  While persuasive, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. provides a convincing response to this 
argument. 
Thus, as the Jefferson Parish court held, “[a]ny inquiry into the validity of a 
tying arrangement must focus on the market or markets in which the two products 
are sold, for that is where the anticompetitive forcing has its impact.”57  This issue 
involves consideration of first whether petitioners are in fact selling two separate 
products that may be tied together, and if so, whether they have used their market 
power to force their customers to accept the tying arrangement.58  This analysis 
leads to another potential issue in the virtual world industry: Are the virtual world 
and the in-game products separate and distinct, or are the products identical and the 
market the same?59  Once we closely examine the economic aspects as well as the 
relevant case law, we see that this issue is easily addressed, and the virtual world is 
indeed distinct and separate from its in-game products. 
V.  MARKET POWER 
Early tying cases involved patent infringement suits and initially embraced 
Chief Justice White’s dissent in Henry v. A.B. Dick & Co.,60 holding that a patent 
or similar monopoly presumptively confers market power upon the seller.61  Over 
the years, however, the Court’s strong disapproval of tying arrangements 
                                                          
U.S. 451, 477–78 (1992); United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters. (Fortner II), 429 U.S. 610, 620 
(1977); Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495, 517–18 (1969); United 
States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45, 48 n.5 (1962); N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6–7. 
55 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15; Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473–74 (“For the service-market 
price to affect equipment demand, consumers must inform themselves of the total cost of the ‘package’ 
. . . at the time of purchase; that is, consumers must engage in accurate lifecyle pricing.”); see also 
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15, n. 24 (“Especially where market imperfections exist, purchasers may 
not be fully sensitive to the price or quality implications of a tying arrangement, and hence it may 
impede competition on the merits.”) (quoting Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive 
Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REV. 661 (1982)). 
56 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17–18. 
57 Id. at 18. 
58 Id. 
59 See id. at 19–20; Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613–14 (1953). 
60 224 U.S. 1, 70 (1912). 
61 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16; United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45–47 
(1962); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). 
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diminished, and rather than relying on assumptions, the Court shifted toward 
requiring a showing of market power in the tying product.62  Eventually, Congress 
amended the Patent Code to eliminate the presumption in the patent misuse 
context.63  In 2006, the Supreme Court effectively killed the patent presumption, 
holding that “in all cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove 
that the defendant has market power in the tying product.”64  Perhaps most relevant 
to the realm of virtual worlds is the Justice Department and the Federal Trade 
Commission’s 1995 joint statement that they “will not presume that a patent, 
copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner.”65  
Thus, for a tying arrangement case to succeed against a virtual world, the 
developer’s copyright alone is insufficient to establish market power; the plaintiff 
must present proof of power in the relevant market.66  The Supreme Court has held 
market power to be the power “to force a purchaser to do something that he would 
not do in a competitive market.”67  It has been further defined as “the ability of a 
single seller to raise price and restrict output.”68 
A helpful place to start the study of market power in virtual worlds is the 
case of Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States.69  In 1864 and 1870, 
Congress granted Northern Pacific Railway’s predecessor (“Railroad”) 
approximately 40 million acres of land to facilitate its construction of a railroad 
from Lake Superior to Puget Sound.70  By 1949, the Railroad had sold about 37 
million acres of its holdings, but had reserved mineral rights in 6.5 million of those 
acres.71  In many of its sales contracts, and in most of its lease agreements, the 
Railroad had inserted “preferential routing” clauses which compelled the purchaser 
or lessee “to ship over its lines all commodities produced or manufactured on the 
land, provided that its rates (and in some instances its service) were equal to those 
of competing carriers.”72  Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, held that 
the Railroad “possessed substantial economic power by virtue of its extensive 
landholdings which it used as leverage to induce large numbers of purchasers and 
lessees to give it preference, to the exclusion of its competitors.”73  The Court 
further noted that the “vice of tying arrangements lies in the use of economic 
power in one market to restrict competition on the merits in another, regardless of 
the source from which the power is derived and whether the power takes the form 
                                                          
62 Compare Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–06 (1949), with Fortner 
II, 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977). 
63 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2006). 
64 See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006). 
65 U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property § 2.2 
(Apr. 6, 1995), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf. 
66 See Ill. Tool, 547 U.S. at 42–43. 
67 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (quoting Jefferson 
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984)). 
68 Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 464 (quoting Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)). 
69 356 U.S. 1 (1958). 
70 Id. at 2–3. 
71 Id. at 3. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 7. 
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of a monopoly or not.” 74 
When we analogize to virtual worlds, it is easy to see that much of the 
Court’s concern is present.  One can hardly dispute the fact that many virtual 
worlds possess extensive landholdings, as well as the ability to increase or 
decrease in-game content, which it can use as leverage over its users to give it 
preference when it comes to purchasing in-game products.75  While the developer 
would certainly argue that it does not require any user to affirmatively purchase 
any particular in-game product, by preventing a user from purchasing an in-game 
product from a third party, it is forcing the user to take the extra time, and thus pay 
additional subscription costs, needed to raise the necessary amount of in-game 
currency, something he or she would not necessarily do “in a competitive 
market.”76  In doing so, the virtual world developer possesses both the ability to 
raise price and restrict output.77 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Eastman Kodak provides further support for 
the notion that virtual worlds may have sufficient market power to implicate the 
Sherman Act’s section 1 prohibition against tying arrangements.78  In the Eastman 
Kodak case, the principal issue was whether a defendant’s lack of market power in 
the primary market precluded, as a matter of law, the possibility of market power 
in derivative aftermarkets.79  After easily holding that plaintiffs had established a 
tie through Kodak’s policy of selling parts to third parties only if they agreed not to 
buy service from independent service organizations, the Court moved to the more 
difficult question of market power.80  Kodak argued that even if it conceded 
monopoly share of the relevant parts market, it could not actually exercise the 
necessary market power for a section 1 violation because competition existed in 
the equipment market.81  Thus, Kodak argued that it could not “raise prices of 
service and parts above the level that would be charged in a competitive market 
because any increase in profits from a higher price in the aftermarkets would be 
offset by a corresponding loss in profits from lower equipment sales.”82  The Court 
refused to accept Kodak’s argument because it did not “accurately explain the 
behavior of the primary and derivative markets for complex durable goods: the 
existence of significant information and switching costs.”83  
The Court first focused on the fact that “[f]or the service-market price to 
affect equipment demand, consumers must inform themselves of the total cost of 
the ‘package’—equipment, service, and parts—at the time of purchase; that is 
consumers must engage in accurate lifecycle pricing.”84  To do so, the customer 
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must acquire and digest a substantial amount of information, including “data on 
price, quality, and availability of products needed to operate, upgrade, or enhance 
the initial equipment, as well as service and repair costs, including estimates of 
breakdown frequency, nature of repairs, price of service and parts, length of 
‘downtime,’ and losses incurred from downtime.”85  Because of the potentially 
high cost of acquiring such information, and the possibility of price discrimination 
between sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers, the Court explained that “it 
ma[de] little sense to assume . . . that equipment-purchasing decisions are based on 
an accurate assessment of the total cost of equipment, service, and parts over the 
lifetime of the machine.”86 
When we apply the lifecycle analysis to virtual worlds, we see an even 
stronger case for the existence of market power on behalf of the developer.  It is 
nearly impossible for consumers to completely inform themselves of the total cost 
of the virtual world “package” at the time of subscription.87  To do so, the user 
would have to acquire and digest information, such as price information for the 
world (and potential competitors), availability of in-game products needed to 
operate, upgrade, or enhance the experience, any additional subscription costs, the 
time required to acquire in-game products, and any potential changes the world 
may make during the life of the virtual world.88  Because of the potentially high 
cost of acquiring such information, the possibility of price discrimination between 
sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers, and the inability of consumers to 
predict future changes to the virtual world, it is hard to see how users could engage 
in effective lifecycle pricing.89 
A second factor the Court considered was the cost to current owners of 
switching to a different product.90  The Court noted that “[i]f the cost of switching 
is high, consumers who have already purchased the equipment, and are thus 
‘locked in,’ will tolerate some level of service-price increases before changing 
equipment brands.”91  Additionally, where the seller can price discriminate 
between its locked-in customers and potential new customers, “this strategy is even 
more likely to prove profitable,” because a seller “could simply charge new 
customers below-marginal cost on the equipment and recoup the charges in 
service.”92  This switching cost analysis is particularly relevant to virtual worlds.  
Any regular virtual world user would argue that the cost of switching virtual 
worlds is prohibitively high.93  Not only are in-game items of no use in other 
virtual worlds, the added social elements unique to each virtual world make it 
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undesirable to switch to a different world.94  Furthermore, virtual worlds often 
engage in price discrimination among existing users and new users.  Second Life, 
for example, initially taxed its residents per object they created, but eventually 
shifted to a property-based economy, establishing a $9.95 per month fee for those 
who wanted to own land.95  It is very likely that a court could infer that a virtual 
world has sufficient market power to raise prices and drive out competition in the 
aftermarkets.96  Indeed, it is just as plausible that a virtual world could choose to 
gain immediate profits by exerting such market power where locked-in customers, 
high information costs, and discriminatory pricing exist.97 
VI.  DISTINCT AND SEPARATE PRODUCTS 
Another issue that must be addressed when determining whether or not a 
tying arrangement exists in a virtual world is whether the tying and tied products 
are indeed separate and distinct products.98  The Jefferson Parish court explained 
that “the answer to the question whether one or two products are involved turns not 
on the functional relation between them, but rather on the character of the demand 
for the two items.”99  The Court stresses the fact that a functional link is not in 
itself sufficient to reject a tying arrangement claim, noting that the Court “has often 
found arrangements involving functionally linked products at least one of which is 
useless without the other to be prohibited tying devices.”100  The question, thus, is 
whether there is a possibility that the economic effect of the arrangement is that a 
defendant has foreclosed competition on the merits in a product market distinct 
from the market for the tying item.101 
In Jefferson Parish, the alleged tying arrangement involved the hospital’s 
contract providing that all anesthesiological services required by its patients would 
be performed by one particular group.102  The Court determined that no tying 
arrangement could exist unless there existed “a sufficient demand for the purchase 
of anesthesiological services separate from the hospital services to identify a 
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distinct product market in which it is efficient to offer anesthesiological services 
separately from hospital services.”103  The Court held that the anesthesiological 
services could have been provided separately and could have been selected either 
by the individual patient or by one of the patient’s doctors if the hospital did not 
insist on the tying arrangement.104  Furthermore, the Court held that consumers 
“differentiate between anesthesiological services and the other hospital services 
provided by [the hospital].”105 
When we apply this analysis to virtual worlds, we see that a subscription to a 
virtual world is separate and distinct from in-game items.  Though these products 
are functionally linked, the economic effect of a ban on real money trading is that 
the virtual world will foreclose competition on the merits in a product market 
distinct from the market for the virtual world itself.106  Also, there is 
unquestionably a sufficient demand for the purchase of in-game items separate 
from the virtual world to identify a distinct product market in which it is efficient 
to offer in-game items separately from a virtual world subscription.107  Indeed, 
many users who are willing to purchase in-game items from third parties do so 
because it is quicker and easier than playing the game long enough to obtain the 
items.108 
The Supreme Court has held that if a firm has been “attempting to exclude 
rivals on some basis other than efficiency, it is fair to characterize its behavior as 
predatory,” and thus exclusionary.109  The existence of third party in-game item 
dealers may increase the demand for the virtual world itself.  By allowing a 
separate market for in-game items, a virtual world may be able to attract 
subscribers to its site that may not have been willing to do so given the perceived 
time commitment of acquiring valuable items.110  Indeed, when viewed in light of 
the market power each individual world possesses, the tying arrangement seems 
not only invalid, but counterproductive. 
VII.  MONOPOLIZATION 
The Supreme Court has held: 
The offense of monopoly under [section] 2 of the Sherman Act has two 
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and 
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished 
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, 
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business acumen, or historic accident.111 
The Court has defined monopoly power as “the power to control prices or 
exclude competition.”112  Furthermore, the existence of such power “may be 
inferred from the predominant share of the market.”113  Important indicators of 
monopoly power include the defendant’s market share (often expressed as a 
percentage) and any barriers to entry.114  As discussed, virtual worlds arguably 
have substantial market power and often possess the power to control prices or 
exclude competition.  The more important, and concededly more difficult, question 
to answer in this context is the question of defining the relevant market.115  Such a 
determination can be determined only after a factual inquiry into the “commercial 
realities” faced by consumers.116  
The Supreme Court in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. held 
that the ultimate question is “whether the defendants control the price and 
competition in the market for such part of trade or commerce as they are charged 
with monopolizing.”117  Of course, every manufacturer is the sole producer of the 
particular commodity it makes, so its control depends upon the availability of 
alternative commodities for buyers, i.e., whether cross-elasticity of demand 
exists.118  One way to determine the presence of cross-elasticity of demand is to 
examine the responsiveness of sales of one product to price changes of the other.119  
As the E.I. du Pont court held, “[d]etermination of the competitive market for 
commodities depends on how different from one another are the offered 
commodities in character or use, how far buyers will go to substitute one 
commodity for another.”120  When a product is controlled by one interest, without 
substitutes available in the market, there is monopoly power.121  However, when 
there are market alternatives that buyers may readily use for their purposes, “illegal 
monopoly does not exist merely because the product said to be monopolized 
differs from others.”122  Thus, commodities reasonably interchangeable by 
consumers for the same purpose make up the relevant market.123 
Applying the E.I. du Pont analysis to virtual worlds leads to the ultimate 
conclusion that the relevant market for a particular virtual world is the virtual 
world itself.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has held on several occasions that “in 
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some instances one brand of a product can constitute a separate market.”124  
Conducting a cross-elasticity of demand analysis would show no responsiveness of 
sales of one virtual world to price changes of another.125  For example, a slight 
decrease in the subscription price of Second Life would not cause a considerable 
number of World of Warcraft users to suddenly switch to Second Life.126  The two 
virtual worlds are quite different from one another in terms of character or use, and 
buyers will not substitute one virtual world for another for the various market 
power reasons previously described.127  There are no market alternatives that users 
may readily use for their purposes, the two worlds are not reasonably 
interchangeable by consumers for the same purpose, and thus each individual 
virtual world would make up the relevant market for monopoly power analysis.128  
Indeed, one trial court has recently found some virtual worlds not to be 
interchangeable in a decision finding Second Life’s Terms of Service to be a 
contract of adhesion.129  In Bragg v. Linden Research, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found there to be “no reasonably 
available market alternatives [to defeat] a claim of adhesiveness.”130  The court 
noted that “[a]lthough it is not the only virtual world on the Internet, Second Life 
was the first and only virtual world to specifically grant its participants property 
rights in virtual land.”131 
The second element of a section 2 claim is the use of monopoly power “to 
foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a 
competitor.”132  While the desire to maintain or increase one’s market share is not 
in itself an antitrust violation, a monopolist must take care that otherwise lawful 
acts do not have anticompetitive effects because of their monopoly power.133  If a 
defendant has taken exclusionary action, such as the tying arrangement previously 
described, to maintain its monopoly and used its control to strengthen its monopoly 
share, “liability turns, then, on whether ‘valid business reasons’ can explain” the 
defendant’s actions.134 
The Eastman Kodak case provides some helpful examples of the kind of 
valid business reasons the Court finds to be potentially questionable.135  Kodak 
first argued that by preventing customers from using independent service 
organizations (“ISO”), “it [could] best maintain high quality service for its 
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sophisticated equipment” and avoid being “blamed for an equipment 
malfunction.”136  The Court refused to grant summary judgment because the ISOs 
were able to offer evidence that they not only provided quality service, but also 
that their service was “preferred by some Kodak equipment owners.”137  The Court 
also argued that this claim did not mesh with the lifecycle issue, noting that 
“Kodak simultaneously claims that its customers are sophisticated enough to make 
complex and subtle lifecycle-pricing decisions, and yet too obtuse to distinguish 
which breakdowns are due to bad equipment and which are due to bad service.”138 
Second, Kodak claimed that the exclusionary actions were valid because 
they improved asset management by reducing Kodak’s inventory costs.139  The 
Court took issue with this justification as well, noting that “the inventory of parts 
needed to repair Kodak machines turns only on breakdown rates, and those rates 
should be the same whether Kodak or ISO’s [sic] perform the repair.”140  Also, this 
justification fails to explain the fact that Kodak “forced [original equipment 
manufacturers], equipment owners, and parts brokers not to sell parts to ISO’s 
[sic], actions that would have no effect on Kodak’s inventory costs.”141 
Lastly, Kodak claimed that its policies prevented ISOs from “exploit[ing] the 
investment Kodak has made in product development, manufacturing and 
equipment sales in order to take away Kodak’s service revenues.”142  The Court 
denied summary judgment here as well, noting that “one of the evils proscribed by 
the antitrust laws is the creation of entry barriers to potential competitors by 
requiring them to enter two markets simultaneously.”143 
When we apply this analysis to virtual worlds, we can see how many of the 
potential justifications a virtual world developer would likely propose for its 
exclusionary conduct with respect to the proposition that RMT should not 
constitute a valid business reason.144  A developer would likely argue that there is 
a concern about maintaining the quality of in-game items because users may not be 
able to tell which avatars have achieved their status through legitimate in-game 
success or through third-party means, or even which avatars are actual people or 
automated bots.  It follows, arguably, that preventing RMT would limit the amount 
of inconsistency and uncertainty for players, thus increasing the overall satisfaction 
of players.145  However, as in Eastman Kodak, RMT traders would counter with 
evidence that their service was preferred by many virtual world subscribers.146  
Again, the same lifecycle issue would arise, as previously discussed, because it is 
nearly impossible for consumers to completely inform themselves of the total cost 
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of the virtual world “package” at the time of subscription.147 
Another proposed valid business reason set forth by virtual worlds would 
likely be that preventing RMT is valid because it reduces inventory costs and 
tempers in-game inflation.148  A court could easily disregard this justification as 
well because the inventory of in-game items, as well as in-game currency, is 
ultimately in the control of the developer.  Should a developer need to control 
inventory costs or inflation, they can do so simply through in-game coding.149  
Also, as in Eastman Kodak, these justifications would fail to explain why a 
developer would prohibit in-game product owners (i.e., users) from selling to real 
money traders or brokers because such actions would have no effect on the 
developer’s inventory costs.150  Finally, a developer’s claim that such policies 
prevent real money traders from exploiting the investment the developer has made 
in product development, manufacturing, and sales in order to take away its in-game 
trade revenues would likely fail.  Such prohibitions would constitute entry barriers 
to potential competitors by requiring them to enter two markets simultaneously, 
something antitrust law explicitly proscribes.151 
The Supreme Court has also found actions which forgo short-run benefits in 
the interest of reducing competition over the long run to be invalid business 
justifications.152  In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the Court 
held that a monopoly, which made a deliberate effort to discourage its customers 
from doing business with its smaller rival, was “motivated entirely by a decision to 
avoid providing any benefit to [its rival] even though . . . [it] would have entailed 
no cost to [defendant] itself, would have provided it with immediate benefits, and 
would have satisfied its potential customers.”153  The Court further noted that the 
defendant “was not motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to 
sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived 
long-run impact on its smaller rival.”154  This is the same motivation that drives 
virtual worlds’ prohibition against RMT.  And, as discussed previously, such 
actions are not motivated by efficiency concerns. 
VIII.  APPLICATION OF SECTION 3 OF THE CLAYTON ACT 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act may also provide some interesting analysis of 
virtual worlds.155  A tying arrangement can violate section 3 of the Clayton Act as 
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well as section 1 of the Sherman Act, but the Clayton Act is violated only when 
products are tied to other products, not services.156  Because the term “commodity” 
is not defined in section 3, courts have adopted its natural context (“goods, wares, 
merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities”) and defined it as “some 
type of tangible property that may be leased or sold.”157  This definition is 
arguably problematic for application to virtual worlds. 
A claimed tying arrangement in a virtual world would entail the tying of in-
game items to the subscription to the virtual world itself through the End User 
License Agreement.  Courts have held that the following items do not fall within 
the definition of a commodity: newspaper advertisements,158 sponsorship rights,159 
banking services,160 extensions of credit,161 franchises,162 trademarks,163 
insurance,164 money165, and services166.  However, courts have held computer 
software to be a commodity for purposes of a tying arrangement under the Clayton 
Act.167  In Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that a 
computer system manufacturer’s refusal to license its NOVA operating system 
software except to purchasers of its NOVA central processing units (“CPUs”) 
constituted an unlawful tying arrangement under both the Sherman Act and the 
Clayton Act.168 
The Digidyne court first found that the CPU and the operating system were 
separate products and that “a demand existed for NOVA instruction set CPUs 
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separate from defendant’s [operating system], and that each element of the NOVA 
computer system could have been provided separately and selected separately by 
customers if defendant had not compelled purchasers to take both.”169  
Additionally, the court found abundant evidence that defendant’s operating system 
was “distinctive and particularly desirable to a substantial number of buyers, and 
could not be readily produced by other sellers.”170  Indeed, defendant’s insistence 
upon licensing only to those who purchased the instruction set CPU “led buyers to 
purchase defendant’s NOVA CPUs who would not have bought them or would 
have bought them elsewhere absent the tying arrangement.”171  This fact pattern is 
analogous to the kind of situation we find in the virtual world context.  In the realm 
of RMT, users can acquire the gaming software and in-game items separately if a 
developer does not compel the user to get both from them.172  Each virtual world’s 
software is distinctive and particularly desirable to a substantial number of buyers, 
and is not readily produced by other sellers.173  As in Digidyne, insistence upon 
licensing only to those who acquired the in-game items from the game forces some 
users to acquire them in-game when they would have preferred to buy them more 
efficiently elsewhere.174 
Perhaps the more interesting question is with respect to the tied product: 
whether it is an in-game item or in-game currency.  While software is considered a 
commodity under the Clayton Act, as previously discussed, money is not.175  So, 
there is an argument that in-game currency would not fall within the definition of 
commodity and a section 3 claim would not apply.176  Whether in-game items 
would qualify as a commodity is a more difficult question.  Applying the definition 
set forth in Satellite T Associate v. Continental Cablevision of Virginia, Inc., courts 
are likely to pounce on the lack of “tangible” characteristics, although such items 
are easily leased or sold.177  Though some recent commentators have suggested 
that virtual goods and virtual alter-egos can be considered property under the 
current legal norms, current legislation has not yet developed a proper framework 
for managing virtual property conflicts.178  Strategically speaking, it may not be 
worth claiming in-game items to be software as well, as the court may conclude 
that the software and the in-game items are not separate and distinct items, 
effectively destroying any section 3 claim.179  Thus, it makes more sense to focus 
on the Sherman Act as a source of claim, rather than risk the chance that a Clayton 
                                                          
169 Id. at 1339. 
170 Id. at 1341. 
171 Id. 
172 See id. at 1339. 
173 See Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1341 (9th Cir. 1984). 
174 See id. 
175 United States v. Investors Diversified Servs., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951). 
176 See id. 
177 See Satellite T Assoc. v. Cont’l Cablevision of Va., Inc., 586 F. Supp. 973, 975 (E.D. Va. 
1982)., aff’d, 714 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1983). 
178 Starodoumov, supra note 25, at 17 (citing F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the 
Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2004)). 
179 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19–20 (1984); Times-Picayune 
Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613–14 (1953). 
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Act claim would be dismissed. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
As we see a vast increase in the impact of virtual worlds on our real-world 
economy, there comes a point when the desire to encourage and foster this new 
and exciting technology should give way to a need to protect competition in the 
marketplace.  While we should not punish those who have achieved success, we 
cannot sit idly by and watch as they exploit their market power and destroy 
competition, often at the expense of the very users they are supposedly trying to 
attract. 
 
